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ABSTRACT
Usage CONtrol (UCON) model is the latest major enhance-
ment of the traditional access control models which enables
mutability of subject and object attributes, and continuity of
control on usage of resources. In UCON, access permission
decision is based on three factors: authorisations, obliga-
tions and conditions. While authorisations and obligations
are requirements that must be fulfilled by the subject and
the object, conditions are subject and object independent
requirements that must be satisfied by the environment. As
a consequence, access permission may be revoked (and the
access stopped) as a result of changes in the environment
regardless of whether the authorisations and obligations re-
quirements are met. This constitutes a major shortcoming
of the UCON model in pervasive computing systems which
constantly strive to adapt to environmental changes so as to
minimise disruptions to the user. To overcome this limita-
tion, this paper proposes a Context-Aware Usage CONtrol
(CA-UCON) model which extends the traditional UCON
model to enable adaptation to environmental changes in the
aim of preserving continuity of access. When the authori-
sations and obligations requirements are met by the subject
and the object, and the conditions requirements fail due
to changes in the environment or the system context, CA-
UCON model triggers specific actions to adapt to the new
situation. Besides the data protection, CA-UCON model
so enhances the quality of services, striving to keep explicit
interactions with the user at a minimum.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.1.6 [Operating Systems]: Security and Protection—
Access Controls; F.1.2 [Computation by Abstract De-
vices]: Modes of Computation—Interactive and reactive com-
putation; K.6.5 [Management of Computing and Infor-
mation Systems]: Security and Protection—unauthorized
access
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1. INTRODUCTION
Information security is a key factor for the acceptance
and adoption of pervasive computing systems where infor-
mation can be accessed and shared by a multitude of small
devices through wireless networks. Unless users are confi-
dent enough that information are exchanged securely, many
would be deterred from using such systems. Nowadays, var-
ious portable devices such as smart phones, Personal Digital
Assistants (PDAs) and laptop computers are being used to
share information and to access digital resources via wire-
less connection to the Internet. Because these are resources
constrained devices and highly mobile, changes in the en-
vironmental context (e.g. location and network availabil-
ity) or device context (e.g. memory and battery) can affect
the security of the system a great deal. A proper security
mechanism must be put in place which is able to cope with
changing environmental and system context.
Usage CONtrol (UCON) model [4] is the latest major en-
hancement of the traditional access control models which
enables mutability of subject and object attributes, and con-
tinuity of control on usage of resources. The concept of mu-
tability refers to the fact that attributes are not static but
does change intermittently and hence the access permission
decision should be dynamic and kept being reevaluated con-
stantly when a new update occurs. Continuity of access de-
cision ensures that decision to permit and allow access to an
object is made constantly before and during the access to an
object. This access decision is based on three key factors:
authorisations, obligations and conditions. Authorisations
are requirements on subject and object attributes that must
hold for permission to be granted; obligations are mandatory
requirements a subject has to perform before permission is
granted; and conditions are requirements the environmental
or system context must fulfil before access is permitted.
Because of the continuity of access decision, access per-
mission may be revoked (and hence the access stopped) as
a result of changes in the environmental or system context,
regardless of whether the authorisations and obligations re-
quirements are met. This constitutes a major shortcoming
of the UCON model in pervasive computing systems which
38
constantly strive to adapt to environmental changes so as
to minimise disruptions to the user. This paper proposes
a Context-Aware Usage CONtrol (CA-UCON) model which
extends the traditional UCON model to enable adaptation
to environmental changes in the aim of preserving continuity
of access. Indeed, when the authorisations and obligations
requirements are met by the subject and the object, and
the conditions requirements fail due to changes in the envi-
ronmental or the system context, CA-UCON model triggers
specific actions to adapt to the new situation. Besides the
data protection, CA-UCON model so enhances the quality
of services, keeping explicit interactions with the user at a
minimum. Our contributions are summarised as follows:
• The architecture of a novel usage control model, CA-
UCON, is proposed (Sect. 2); its main innovative fea-
ture is the integration of continuity of usage decision
and dynamic adaptation to changes in the environ-
mental or system context, so as to ensure continuity of
usage.
• The computational model of the CA-UCON model is
formally specified as a Finite State Machine (FSM)
which describes how an access request is handled in
the CA-UCON model (Sect. 3).
• The formal definitions of the CA-UCONABD family
core models are given (Sect. 4), where A stands for
Authorisations, B for oBligations and D for aDapata-
tions.
• Finally, we show that the UCON model can be spec-
ified in CA-UCON (Sect. 5) and so all the security
models that can be specified in UCON, such as Role-
Based Access Control (RBAC) and Digital Rights Man-
agement (DRM).
2. ARCHITECTURE OF CA-UCON MODEL
The architecture of the CA-UCON model is depicted in
Fig. 1. It highlights the usage decision (UD) component and
the adaptation decision (AD) component. The former is de-
scribed as in the UCON model, making decision of granting
or denying rights based on the authorisation, obligation and
condition components. The latter decides what adaptation
action to perform depending on the environmental context
which is refined into subject context, object context, infor-
mation and communication technology (ICT) context, and
the physical environment context. The two dashed ovals
materialise the fact that usage decision and adaptation de-
cision happen continuously before and during usage. Fol-
lowing are the intuitive meanings of the key components of
the CA-UCON model.
Subjects (S) and subject Attributes (ATT(S)).
A subject is an entity who requests access to a resource
and must hold certain rights of access to the target object
or resource. Subject has attributes which are used in the
usage decision making. We let S denote the set of subjects
and ATT (S) denote the set of subject attributes.
Object (O) and Object Attributes (ATT(O)).
Object is the resource or entity which the subject has
to hold a certain right to access or use. Object attributes
are the descriptions and properties of a given object which
Figure 1: Architecture of The CA-UCON model
could be used as the basis for the provision and making of
the usage decision process. Let O denote the set of objects
and ATT (O), the set of object attributes.
Rights (R).
Rights are privileges that subject can hold and use on
an object. The subject must fulfil the authorizations, obli-
gations and conditions requirements in order to be granted
the right to access the object. The subject loses this right
anytime one of these requirements does not hold. If this
happen during access, there are two possibilities: (i) if ei-
ther authorisations requirement or obligations requirement
is not fulfilled, then the access right is revoked and the ac-
cess stopped at once; (ii) if both authorisations requirement
and obligations requirement are fulfilled, but the conditions
requirement is not met due to changes in the environmental
context, the system will attempt to adapt to the new sit-
uation by performing specific adaptation actions (including
request to alternative object); if the adaptation is success-
ful then the access continues, otherwise the access right is
revoked and the access terminated.
Authorisations (A).
Authorisations are a key functional requirement that must
be fulfilled before granting a particular right of access to
a digital object. Authorization predicates place conditions
and constraints in the form of logical predicates on both the
subject and object attributes. The authorization predicates
are activated and evaluated both before (pre-authorization)
and during (ongoing-authorization) access.
oBligations (B).
Obligations are also functional predicates which are used
to confirm mandatory requirements that a subject must un-
dertake both before and during a particular usage process.
The mandatory requirements here may be either pre-obligations
(preB) to be fulfilled before access permission is granted or
ongoing-obligations (onB) to be fulfilled during access.
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Conditions (C).
Conditions are environmental constraints that must be
considered in the process of usage decisions. Conditions are
not related directly to objects or subjects, but they are based
on environmental attributes. The evaluation of condition
predicates may take place before granting permission to ac-
cess a digital object (pre-conditions) or while the subject is
using the object (on-conditions). When conditions fail due
to changes in the environmental context, adaptation actions
are triggered in an attempt to change the environmental
context such that these conditions hold.
Subject Context.
Subject context is any type of context information linked
to the subject such as his location, activity, preferences, and
people nearby.
Object Context.
Object context refers to any kinds of context information
related to the object. These can be the location of the ob-
ject, execution state, nearby resources and availability.
Physical environments context.
This characterises relevant physical phenomena taking place
such as the time, light, noise level, temperature, weather and
so on.
ICT context .
ICT context is general term that deals with any kind of
context information related to ICT and computing system
included any communication devices or applications nearby.
Examples of these contexts include: laptops battery rate,
network reliability, smart phones memory size, PDAs and
hardware capability and communication bandwidth. In ad-
dition, the diverse services and applications related to them,
such as video-conferencing and distance learning.
Adaptation Actions .
Adaptation action is an operation that should be per-
formed over condition predicate with the purpose of over-
coming the environments changes. These actions may be
classified according to the subject of the adaptation and
the scope. For example, service instance adaptation actions
(retry, duplicate service, and substitute service) and flow in-
stance adaptation actions (redo, choose alternative service,
and undo).
3. COMPUTATIONAL MODEL OF THE CA-
UCON MODEL
The computational model of CA-UCON model can be de-
scribed as a Finite State Machine (FSM) depicting how an
subject’s request to access an object is handled in the CA-
UCON model. The FSM is depicted by the graph in Fig.
2, where nodes are called states and edges are called transi-
tions. The initial state, labelled initial, corresponds to the
state when the system is waiting for a suject to submit a
request. There are three final states: end, when the access
has successfully terminated; denied, when the access request
has been denied; and revoked, when access permission has
been revoked during access and hence the access stopped.
The intuitive meaning of the remaining states of the FSM
can be summarised as follows: requesting, denotes when the
access request is being processed; accessing, represents the
state when the actual access is taking place; preadapting, is
the state when the system is trying to adapt to the envi-
ronmental context prior to access; and finally onadapting,








































Figure 2: Execution of an access request in the CA-
UCON model
The transitions of the FSM are labelled with the events
(or actions) that fire them. The event tryaccess occurs when
a suject sends an access request (e.g. by clicking a menu but-
ton). This event forces the FSM to enter the requesting state
to process that access request. While in this state, the sys-
tem can perform updates on subject’s and object’s attributes
through preupdate events. If the authorisations, obligations
and conditions requirements are all met, the system emits
the permitaccess event and moves into the accessing state.
If for some reasons either the authorisations requirement
or the obligations requirement is not met, the sytem emits
the event denyaccess and terminates in the denied state.
However, if both the authorisations requirement and obliga-
tions requirement are met, but the conditions requirement
is not satisfied, the system emits the preadaptaccess event
and moves into the preadapting state. In this state, specific
adaptation actions, denoted by the preadapt events, are per-
formed in an attempt to meet the conditions requirement. If
the adaptation is successful, the permitaccess event is raised
and the system transitions into the accessing state. In addi-
tion, a new request to access a specified alternative object,
denoted by the tryaltaccess event, may be issued automati-
cally by the system if the adaptation actions fail. Otherwise
the access request is simply denied when no adaptation is
possible.
When access permission is granted (see permitaccess event),
the system transitions into the accessing state in which the
actual access takes place. During access the system can per-
form updates on subject’s and object’s attributes via onup-
date events. If during access either the authorisations re-
quirement or the obligations requirement is not met, the
sytem emits the event revokeaccess and terminates in the
revoked state. However, if both the authorisations require-
ment and obligations requirement are continuously met, but
the conditions requirement fails, the system raises the on-
adaptaccess event and moves into the onadapting state. In
this state, specific adaptation actions, denoted by the on-
adapt events, are performed in an attempt to meet the con-
ditions requirement. If the adaptation is successful, the con-
tinueaccess event is raised and the system moves back into
the accessing state. In the effort to enhance the quality of
service even further, the system might issue an implicit re-
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quest to access a specified alternative object through the
tryaltaccess event, when the adaptation actions fail. In the
worst case when no adaptation is possible, the access per-
mission is simply revoked and the access stopped at once.
When an access terminates successully via the endaccess
event, the system moves into the end state and eventu-
ally performs updates on subject’s and object’s attributes
through postupdate events.
4. THE CA-UCONABD FAMILY CORE MOD-
ELS
Park et al. [4] defined the UCONABC family core models
where A stands for Authorisations, B for oBligations and
C for Conditions. Here we define the CA-UCONABD fam-
ily core models where C is replaced by D for aDaptation.
So the CA-UCONA and CA-UCONB family core models
are identical to UCONA and UCONB, respectively. The
CA-UCOND family core model comprises two models: the
pre-adaptation model CA-UCONpreD and the ongoing adap-
tation model CA-UCONonD, which are detailed below.
4.1 The CA-UCONpreD Model
In the CA-UCONpreD model, adaptation can be activated
only before the access permission is granted. That is adap-
tation cannot take place during access. If s is subject, o and
object and r an access right, we let preD(s, o, r) denote a
predicate which is true if the pre-adaptation is successful and
false otherwise. We also denote the access permission deci-
sion by the predicate allowed(s, o, r). The CA-UCONpreD
core model is composed of the following elements:
• S : set of subjects, ATT(S): set of subject attributes,
O : set of objects, ATT (O): set of object attributes
• AD : set of adaptation actions.
• PreCON : set of pre-conditions elements.
• T : time domain.
• PreAdapted : 2preCON×AD × T −→ {true, false}
preAdapted(c, a, t) is a boolean function that performs
the adaptation action a until all the conditions in c
evaluate to true, in which case the function returns
true; otherwise the function returns false after t time-
units have elapsed since the execution of the action a
started.
• getPreADAPT : S ×O ×R −→ 2preCON ×AD × T
getPreADAPT(s, o, r) returns a tuple (c, a, t) where
c is the set of all pre-conditions required to grant the
subject s the access right r upon the object o, a is the
adaptation action to be performed if any of the pre-
conditions does not hold, and t is the time-out for this
adaptation process.
• getPreAltReq : S ×O ×R −→ 2O×R
getPreAltReq(s, o, r) denotes the set of alternative re-
quests that can be made on behalf of the subject s
when the initial request of the access right r upon the
object o could not be granted due to environmental
conditions.
• preD(s, o, r) = preAdapted(getPreADAPT(s, o, r ))
• The access permission decision is defined as:
allowed(s, o, r)⇒
 preD(s, o, r)∨∨
(o′,r′)∈E
allowed(s, o′, r ′)

where E = getPreAltReq(s, o, r) and the symbol ‘⇒’
denotes the logical implication.
4.2 The CA-UCONonD Model
In the CA-UCONonD model, there is no pre-adaptation;
adaptation can only take place during access. If s is subject,
o and object and r an access right, we let onD(s, o, r) denote
a predicate which is true if the ongoing adaptation is success-
ful and false otherwise. We also denote by stopped(s, o, r)
a predicate which is true if the access has been stopped.
The CA-UCONonD core model is composed of the following
elements:
• S : set of subjects, ATT(S): set of subject attributes,
O : set of objects, ATT (O): set of object attributes
• AD : set of adaption strategies (or actions)
• onCON : set of ongoing-conditions elements
• T : time domain
• onAdapted : 2onCON ×AD × T → {true, false}
onAdapted(c, a, t) is a boolean function that performs
action a until all the conditions in c evaluate to true,
in which case the function returns true; otherwise the
function returns false after t time-units have elapsed
since the execution of the action a started.
• getOnADAPT : S ×O ×R→ 2onCON ×AD × T
getOnADAPT(s,o, r ) returns a tuple (c, a, t) where
c is the set of all ongoing-conditions required for the
subject s to keep the right r upon the object o during
access, a is the adaptation action to be performed if
any of the ongoing-conditions does not hold, and t is
the time-out for this adaptation process.
• getOnAltReq : S ×O ×R→ 2O×R
getOnAltReq(s, o, r) denotes the set of alternative re-
quests that can be made on behalf of the subject s
when the initial request of the access right r upon the
object o fails during access due to environmental con-
ditions.
• onD(s, o, r) = onAdapted(getOnADAPT(s, o, r ))
• allowed(s, o, r )⇒ true
• The predicate stopped is defined as follows:
stopped(s, o, r)⇐
 ¬onD(s, o, r)∧∧
(o′,r′)∈F
stopped(s, o′, r ′)

where F = getOnAltReq(s, o, r) and the formula V ⇐
W means that W implies V .
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5. EXPRESSIVE POWER OF THE CA-UCON
MODEL
In this section we show that the UCON model can be
specified in CA-UCON and so all the security models that
can be specified in UCON, such as Role-Based Access Con-
trol (RBAC) and Digital Rights Management (DRM). As
mentioned in the previous section, the authorisation and
obligation family core models of CA-UCON are identical to
those of UCON. Rest to prove that the condition family core
models of UCON can be modelled by the adaptation family
core models of CA-UCON.
Indeed, the UCONpreC model is a special case of CA-
UCONpreD model where:
• AD = skip, where {skip} is a special action that does
nothing and lasts one time-unit.
• T = {1}, the unique time-out is one time-unit.
• getPreAltReq(s, o, r) = φ, for all (s, o, r) ∈ S×O×R.
Similarly, the UCONonC model is a special case of CA-
UCONonD model where:
• AD = {skip}, where skip is a special action that does
nothing and lasts one time-unit.
• T = {1}, the unique time-out is one time-unit.
• getOnAltReq(s, o, r) = φ, for all (s, o, r) ∈ S ×O×R.
6. RELATED WORK
Many works have been carried out in the area of context-
aware access control model which combine the context in-
formation with credentials while making access control deci-
sions. A context-aware role-based access control (CGRBAC)
model was proposed by [6], to address a new set of challenges
which was not addressed by the traditional security mod-
els, hence introducing “global rol” and “contex” to the basic
RBAC model. The model can be expanded to address global
services and as well as environment-relevant issues. More-
over, another model was proposed by [2] in which they gen-
eralized the context-based access control model that offers
the resource to owners and access control administrators the
ability of defining the context-based access policies consid-
ering the context of the information describing the owner’s,
requester’s and resource’s situations. The model also con-
siders both the owner’s, requestor’s and resource’s context
when making context-based access control decisions. How-
ever, the proposed model extends its support for defining
access policies which are completely based on the context
information, outlining seven types of context-based access
context control policies.
[7] came out with the idea of control architecture, the
context-aware access control enable the provision of e-services
based on an end-to-end web services infrastructure. Fur-
thermore, the proposed control architecture can allow con-
trol access to distribute web services through an interme-
diary server, transparently to both clients and protected
resources. This access control mechanism is based on an
RBAC model which incorporates dynamic context informa-
tion. Although, [1] has extended the traditional role-based
access control that imbeds the notion of an environment role,
their approach focuses on solving the problem of accessing
dynamic context services and utilizing environment roles for
the user-aware web in a context aware computing environ-
ment. It can be noticed that the research has shown how the
developed concept of a role can be implemented to capture
relevant security in the context of the environment in which
access requests are made.
[3] suggested that an adaptive access control scheme should
be utilizing a context awareness in pervasive computing en-
vironments in which he designed an adaptive access control
model based on the traditional RBAC model, and also pre-
sented an adaptive access control scheme to guarantee flex-
ibility to the user and according to the changes of context.
According to [8] a Context-aware Task-role based Access
Control (CTRBAC) model should provide a detail context-
aware access control for pervasive computing in enterprise
environments. The ideal behind it, is that it extends the T-
RBAC model by dynamically adjusting the role assignments
based on the current context information and ultimately de-
ciding on whether the user is authorized to execute the task
or not.
[5] also mentioned that a context aware access control
model based on the RBAC model . As such the model can
assign roles dynamically to the users and restrict their access
within the context of information. The model was presented
in a formal simple case study to demonstrate the application
of the model.
However, the above-mentioned research works do apply
context-awareness on traditional access control such as Role-
based Access Control (RBAC). In our work, we extend the
usage control model (UCON), which is the latest major en-
hancement of the traditional access control models, to make
it adaptive and context-aware.
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper we proposed a context-aware usage con-
trol model (CA-UCON) that extends the traditional UCON
model to enable adaptation to environmental condition (or
context). In addition to the authorisation and obligation
family core model of UCON, CA-UCON includes two new
core models: the pre-adaptation model (CA-UCONpreD )
and the ongoing adaptation model (CA-UCONonD). We
show that these two models can be used to represent the
pre-condition model and ongoing-condition model of UCON,
respectively.
In future works, we will investigate a formal specification
of the CA-UCON model and investigate possible enforce-
ment mechanisms of the model in a pervasive environment.
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[2] H. M. José Bringel Filho. A generalized context-based
access control model for pervasive environments. In
Proceedings of the 2nd SIGSPATIAL ACM GIS 2009
International Workshop on Security and Privacy in
GIS and LBS, 2009.
[3] H. J. Jung Hwan Choi, Dong Hyun Kang and Y. I.
Eom. Adaptive access control scheme utilizing context
awareness in pervasive computing environments. In
Performance, Computing and Communications
42
Conference, 2008. IPCCC 2008. IEEE International,
2008.
[4] J. Park and R. Sandhu. The UCONABC usage control
model. ACM Transactions on Information and System
Security, 7(1):128–174, February 2004.
[5] S. Z. Sareh Sadat Emami, Morteza Amini. A
context-aware access control model for pervasive
computing environments. In 2007 International
Conference on Intelligent Pervasive Computing, 2007.
[6] H. F. SHEN Haibo. A context-aware role-based access
control model for web services. In Proceedings of the
2005 IEEE International Conference on e-Business
Engineering (ICEBEÂŠ05), 2005.
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